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I. INTRODUCTION: COMMODIFICATION IN EDUCATION REFORM
This Essay argues that criticism of the testing movement by those
with expertise in education, such as the renowned anti-poverty
activist Jonathan Kozol quoted above, reference concepts and
concerns that map remarkably well onto philosophical discussions of
commodification as well as behavioral economics discussions of
intrinsic motivations. This Essay explores both the similarities among
these discourses and the possible insights that may be brought to the
education debate from the commodification literature in philosophy
and economics.
The philosophy scholar Elizabeth S. Anderson argues that to value
something differently than as a commodity is to recognize a ―special
intrinsic worth‖ to that item.2 If it is appropriate to apply ―use‖ as the
proper mode of valuation, then market norms are acceptable. But if a
different mode of valuation is appropriate, such as ―love, admiration,
honor, and appreciation,‖3 then we should not treat that item as a
commodity.4 ―Use‖ as a value is simply utilitarian, while the other
modes require a more nuanced version of value. Martha C. Nussbaum
has written of the ―incommensurable plurality of values‖5—one item
might be measurable in a valuation scale translatable to dollars
(market value), while a different item is valued in terms that cannot
enjoy a common metric with the first item (e.g., respect, love).6 The
two are incommensurable: because they are valued on different
scales, their value cannot be compared to one another. The
commodification concern can be stated a number of ways, but it
ordinarily contrasts the language and norms of the market with
language, norms, and understandings that seem incompatible with the
market.7 While the commodification concern has proved vulnerable
2. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women‟s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71,
73 n.2 (1990).
3. Id. at 72.
4. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 8–11 (1993).
5. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE 112 (1990).
6. Id. at 106–24.
7. The commodification literature is extensive. In addition to Anderson and Nussbaum,
see, for example, MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); HILARY
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
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to an array of legitimate criticism,8 it has proved resilient in
describing a difficulty utilitarianism has accounting for plural values
under some circumstances.
This Essay looks at the movement within public education toward
common standards and assessments represented most prominently by
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).9 This movement is
characterized by a drive to create common metrics in the form of test
scores for evaluating the quality of educational programming within
each state. This movement invites measurement based on this metric
and invites comparisons among districts, schools, teachers, and
students along this same scale. Writing on the standards movement is
split between those explicating the virtues of a common metric by
which to make comparisons, measure progress, and correct stagnation
and those anxious that test scores have swallowed other notions of
the good in public education. The latter concern is well summarized
in the words of educational equity author Jonathan Kozol, ―the testsand-standards movement . . . ha[s] been loaded with a coarse
utilitarian toxicity and a demeaning anti-human view of childhood
right from the start.‖10
In this regard, the standards-and-testing debate mimics many
familiar concerns from the commodification debate within
philosophy and law. But the debate over the testing movement
represents an interesting variation because tests scores play the role
that prices do in the commodification literature. The commodification
debate juxtaposes market valuation with all other forms of valuation,
while the standards and accountability debate juxtaposes the nonmarket metric of test scores with more plural conceptions of
educational purpose, quality, and outcomes.
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS
ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF
INTIMACY (2005) [hereinafter ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY]; VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985);
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) [hereinafter RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION].
8. For an early example and discussion of the critical literature, see Katharine Silbaugh,
Commodification and Women‟s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997).
9. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
10. Kozol, supra note 1, at 22.
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The behavioral economics literature on motivations speaks to this
cross-discipline project as well.11 In particular, the ―crowding out‖
effect may be a reason for concern in a testing-based educational
culture. Crowding-out occurs when extrinsic motivation, particularly
receipt of a payment, diminishes intrinsic motivations.12 Crowdingout has been demonstrated even where the extrinsic motivation is
non-monetary. This suggests potential applicability of crowding-out
theory to student motivation to learn and school personnel motivation
to teach where testing values dominate. For example, extrinsic
monitoring of task completion diminishes intrinsic motivation to
complete tasks, even though that extrinsic monitoring does not entail
monetary rewards.13 This behavioral economics literature may give
some empirical basis for a phenomenon long observed and discussed
in the commodification literature—that a good can be changed when
measured according to a metric that does not capture
incommensurable modes of valuation.14
Several studies have found that paying students for test score
improvement lowers test scores below the baseline once the payment
is withdrawn.15 Although these studies do not demonstrate that
testing alone crowds-out intrinsic motivations in education because
they evaluate payment for testing, they do indicate that there are
vulnerable intrinsic motivations available in the school environment
under some circumstances. Where there are intrinsic motivations,
external monitoring of learning through standardized testing may risk
crowding out intrinsic motivations to learn. This perverse effect
11. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
12. Margit Osterloh, Jetta Frost & Bruno S. Frey, The Dynamics of Motivation in New
Organizational Forms, 9 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 61, 67–68 (2002); BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST
FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 14–15 (1997).
13. David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort?
The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories, 63 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 56, 57 (2008).
14. Part II discusses the approach in the commodification literature.
15. Eric P. Bettinger, Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary
School Test Scores, CESIFO (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifo
Content/N/neucesifo/CONFERENCES/SC_CONF_2008/ei08/Papers/ei08_Bettinger.pdf; Ellen
Garbarino & Robert Slonim, Pay-to-Perform Educational Policy: An Experiment Examining a
Crowding Out Effect, UC SANTA BARBARA ECON. (Mar. 2005), http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/
conferences/charness06/docs/slonim.pdf.
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achieved through the transformation of motivations and values is
described, using different language, in both the commodification
literature within philosophy and the behavioral economics literature.
This Essay explores the standards and assessment movement in K12 public education, and compares it to the commodification
literature around market values and norms and the crowding-out
literature. The comparison allows us to ask whether it is market
values alone that are a problem, or instead common metrics of any
sort. It lets us consider the insights from the commodification
literature when evaluating the potential harms of the testing
movement. Incommensurability—the inability to rank values—is a
good threatened by both pricing and test scores. By positing ―testing
as commodification,‖ this Essay seeks to raise questions for further
investigation about the relationship between broad and pluralistic
educational goals and values, the pressures toward measurement and
a single metric that standardized testing establishes, crowding out,
and the commodification literature on the corruption of value.
II. COMMODIFICATION AS A SINGLE METRIC OF VALUE
In his Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Oxford University,
Michael Sandel asks us to distinguish two aspects of
commodification critiques: those concerned about coercion and those
concerned about corruption.16 When an argument is made to prohibit
market exchanges that may exploit a financially needy person into
selling something personally difficult to part with, such as sex or
surrogacy, the argument is first about coercion. But the pro-market
response is that she chooses to make a trade to improve her situation
by her own measure, and so the idea of exploitation or coercion must
either be better theorized with conditions for meaningful consent, or
in the alternative, abandoned. In a perfect market, a trade cannot be
coerced.
16. Michael J. Sandel, Prof. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral
Limits of Markets, Lecture at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94 (1998), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/
lectures/documents/Sande100.pdf.
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The concern about corruption, however, is not as easily answered
with a hypothetically perfected market. Sandel explains this objection
as follows: ―[C]ertain moral and civic goods are diminished or
corrupted if bought and sold for money.‖17 This is because the proper
―mode of valuation,‖ in Elizabeth Anderson’s terminology, is passed
by in favor of the market mode of valuation. The good is corrupted,
its value improperly assessed and acted upon, because the wrong
mode of valuation is used (not the wrong ranking on a numeric
metric). This theoretical contention is enhanced by the empirical one
demonstrated in the economics literature on motivations: pay as
―extrinsic motivation‖ can ―crowd-out,‖ meaning diminish, intrinsic
motivation, rather than complementing it. The behavioral economics
studies demonstrate that motivations are corrupted, meaning altered
and degraded, by the introduction of monetary motivations.
Anderson’s contention that modes of valuation differ immediately
invites controversy over the proper mode of valuation for any given
matter—controversy that’s difficult to resolve to everyone’s
satisfaction in hard cases. When Anderson applied her idea of
improper modes of valuation to paid surrogacy, for example, some
questioned whether her idea of the proper alternative mode of
valuation—emotional bonds between mother and child—are unduly
maternalist and foreclose other potential valences of reproductive
labor.18 Using language such as ―intrinsic worth‖ to describe
reproduction invites an essentialism concern that many feminists find
objectionable. Some have also expressed concern about an elitism in
denying wages for the purpose of preserving meaning. 19 In part for
this reason, Margaret Radin argued powerfully for the importance of
plural meanings,20 and Viviana Zelizer for avoiding either-or
characterizations.21 The notion of worth and value need not be
intrinsic to be robust and plural, however, and Anderson’s
17. Id.
18. Martha M. Ertman, What‟s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved
Theory of Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 7, at 303;
Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women‟s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 81, 104–07 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 8, at 104–07.
20. RADIN, supra note 7, at 103, 107 (1996).
21. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY, supra note 7.
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philosophical characterizations are echoed in some economic
literature documenting incentive effects contrary to what a rational
actor model might suppose.22
From the rich literature on commodification we might draw an
important lesson about the corrupting influence of markets. We
should not overstate the harms of positing that money can be a
fruitful way to express aspects of certain social practices that have
resisted commodification.23 To the contrary, expressions of market
attributes can at times have a liberating effect on regressive and
inegalitarian social practices.24 But there is a danger that market
valuations may be so powerful that they will extinguish or
significantly diminish alternative modes of valuation and metrics that
could co-exist with market valuations. Radin expressed this concern
early on using the term ―domino theory‖25 and still considers it an
important caution.26 Uniformity of conception is the danger, and the
literature on commodification conceives of uniformity in market
terms. Market modes of valuation have trouble co-existing with other
forms of valuation. A question worth investigating is why some
modes of valuation would so overpower others—why market
valuation is particularly unifying, why payment would at times
diminish motivation instead of enhancing it.
It is this question—how one mode of valuation threatens to so
colonize others as to either extinguish or thoroughly transform
them—that can be mapped onto the standards and testing movements
that have gripped the education world for several decades. In
undertaking to compare the two, we may see the unifying power of
the market in a different light. In the education context we can see
that it is not the norms and values of the market that have the power
to extinguish other values, but it is test scores. Education and markets
22. See, e.g., RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
23. See generally Ertman, supra note 18, at 304; Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to
Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public Assistance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2002); Carol
Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 67 (2007); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1575 (1996).
24. Ertman, supra note 18, at 305; Silbaugh, supra note 18, at 83.
25. RADIN, supra note 7, at 95–101.
26. Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification,
in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 7, at 8, 17.
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have the existence of a unitary metric in common—price for markets,
test scores for education. Both unitary metrics use numbers, and so
both clearly invite ranking and comparison that is difficult to achieve
with non-monetary values such as respect, self-knowledge, or
courage.
While there are education scholars who argue against testing
altogether,27 most critics of the standards movement believe in the
importance of assessment to improve their teaching practice by
looking for evidence of progress and learning. But as the standards
and testing movement has continued to increase in force, many in the
education world complain about its homogenizing effect.28 Like the
concern about the domino effect, educators worry that increasing the
significance of a single metric in the form of standardized test results
is extinguishing other values in education that are important to the
purposes of public education but that are not susceptible to that single
metric.29
The thesis of this Essay is that commodification anxiety does not
depend on markets but rather on the unifying force of single metrics.
What Sandel calls the ―corruption risk‖ in commodification
discourse30 is robust and visible in anxieties about education reform.31
Similarly, the ―crowding-out‖ effect demonstrated in the behavioral
economics literature may be frustrating the goals of reform as
students’ intrinsic motivation declines in the face of broad, uniform
assessment. In this sense education reform is corrupting value in
public education.
27. Alfie Kohn, Raising the Scores, Ruining the Schools, FAIRTEST (Dec. 19, 2007),
http://www.fairtest.org/raising-scores-ruining-schools.
28. Elliot W. Eisner, Multiple Intelligences: Its Tensions and Possiblities, 106 TCHRS. C.
REC. 31, 33–34 (2004).
29. Alfie Kohn, Debunking the Case for National Standards, EDUC. WK., Jan. 14, 2010, at
28, 28; Qiuyun Lin, Beyond Standardization: Testing and Assessment in Standards-Based
Reform, ACTION TCHR. EDUC., Winter 2002, at 43, 44–45.
30. Sandel, supra note 16.
31. Tsilly Dagan has recently made a similar point in a draft entitled ―Commodification
Without Money,‖ in which she argues that government regulations from taxation to healthcare
regulations employ common metrics that are reductive and flattening. Tsilly Dagan,
Commodification Without Money (Bar-Ilan Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 03-10, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/So13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1537586.
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III. THE EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENT
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education
published the report entitled A Nation at Risk.32 The report enhanced
fears that the public education system in the United States was failing
relative to other developed countries.33 From the time of its
publication forward, standards-based reform and test-based
accountability have been at the center of education reform debates
and in recent years at the center of education reform practices.
Standards-based reforms aim to redouble the academic mission in
schools by creating content standards, aligning those with educational
outcome measures through standardized testing, requiring teacher
qualifications aligned with standards, and holding schools and
teachers accountable for outcomes. Demanding content, testing to
measure outcomes, and accountability for student achievement have
become central to education policy.
Of these reforms, the most visible are the outcome tests
themselves. Reform pressures and incentives throughout the 1990s,
culminating in the passage of NCLB, have led to the development of
robust testing regimes in all fifty states. While each state sets its own
content standards and develops its own assessments and cut scores to
measure progress, the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) is used to ensure that states do not set their standards too
low.34 Children are tested at least once each year in grades 3-8, and
once between 10–12.35 The high school tests are ordinarily ―highstakes,‖ meaning students must pass them in order to receive a high
school diploma. NCLB focuses on testing in math and language arts,
with science assessments added only recently.36
Every state sets a definition of ―proficient‖ at these subject areas
for each grade and creates a test to assess each student’s
32. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://datacenter.spps.org/sites/2259653e-ffb345ba-8fd6-04a024ecf7a4/uploads/SOTW_A_Nation_at_Risk_1983.pdf [hereinafter A NATION
AT RISK].
33. Id.
34. NAEP Overview, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreport
card/about/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
35. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(C) (2006).
36. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(C).
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proficiency.37 By the year 2014, NCLB requires every school in
every state to bring every child to proficiency, as defined by that
state.38 Each year between the law’s passage and the target year 2014,
each school must make ―adequate yearly progress‖ (AYP) toward
that proficiency goal.39 A school is making adequate yearly progress
if the percentage of students whose test scores are above that line
increases at a rate that could mathematically achieve 100 percent by
2014, according to annual benchmarks the state has set for itself.40
The law includes a series of increasingly serious sanctions for
failure to make AYP, including the firing of staff, reorganization of
the governance structure of a school (e.g., turning it into a charter),
and closing the school altogether.41 Because the targets are ambitious,
an increasing percentage of schools are labeled ―failing‖ each year as
we approach 2014.42 In 2009, approximately a third of the nation’s
schools were labeled ―failing,‖ and in states with high standards such
as Massachusetts, more than half of the state’s schools are now
failing as measured by the Act—despite that state’s comparative
reputation for excellence in public education.43 It would be hard to
overstate the significance of these developments to the culture of
public education.
A. Equity
Proponents of the law focus in particular on its equity component,
aimed at closing the achievement gap between white students and
students of color, as well as other disadvantaged students such as
English language learners and low-income students.44 To make
adequate yearly progress, it is not enough for a school to meet the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. § 6311(b)(1)(D).
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A)–(C).
Id. § 6316.
Lynn Olson, As AYP Bar Rises, More Schools Fail, EDUC. WK., Sept. 20, 2006, at 1.
CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, HOW MANY SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS HAVE NOT MADE
ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS? FOUR-YEAR TRENDS 9 (2010), available at http://www.cep-dc.
org/index.cfm?DocumentSubSubTopicID=8.
44. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE REDUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP:
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY (Alan R. Sadovnik et al.
eds., 2007).
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increasing percentage targets for its student body as a whole. The law
requires schools to report test outcomes by a number of subgroups,
including race, special education, limited English proficiency, and
low-income classifications.45 The school must bring each sub-group
to the annual benchmark percentage.46
This equity component means that a school cannot make adequate
yearly progress by increasing the percentage of typically-developing
middle income white students who reach proficiency at a sufficient
rate to compensate for stagnating percentages of English language
learners, low income students, special needs students, or racial
minorities. This provision of the law requires schools to focus on
closing the traditional achievement gaps among these groups. NCLB
is thus widely understood to contain laudable equity goals intended to
focus schools on improving the performance of student sub-groups
that have been ―left behind‖ in the U.S. education system. Many
reformers have observed that the United States education system is
already adequate in many suburban districts, and the most appalling
schools are almost exclusively attended by students with little social
capital, particularly in urban school systems.47 But even in suburban
schools, the achievement gap by race persists, and NCLB prevents
such schools from self-congratulatory assessments about the
achievement of its white students if its African American students,
for example, are not also increasing their movement toward 100
percent proficiency.
The irony of this equity component of NCLB, however, is clear to
those who study high-poverty districts. It is upon those students in
particular—the ones historically so badly underserved by public
education—that the most negative corrupting effects of the standards
movement fall. While suburban schools are likely to retain music, art,
critical thinking, research papers and other project-based work
because they can do so and still achieve AYP, poorer districts have
been reduced to ―drill-and-kill‖ test prep to the exclusion of other
45. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II).
46. Id. § 6493.
47. See JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF
APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005).
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aspects of teaching that are not susceptible to clear measurement. 48
The flattening effect on curriculum and content is not evenly
distributed but falls most heavily on those groups historically
disadvantaged in our education system. Because the standards
movement does not aim to close the achievement gap by evening
resources among wealthier and poorer districts, the decisions made in
poorer districts must be different than those made in wealthier
districts, and the poorer districts are therefore more sensitive to the
negative effects of teaching to the test.
B. Metrics and Commensurability as Translation Between Educators
and Policymakers or Parents
The achievement goals of NCLB were set in the political arena,
not by schools or educators. This was the point: those who are
politically accountable felt that schools needed external motivation,
in the form of accountability, to deliver great education. As critics of
the law have pointed out, the achievement goals were not set in
relation to an assessment of what schools have the capacity to
achieve49 but in relation to election cycles and other exogenous
pressures.
Most followers of the education reform movement would have to
acknowledge a strand of distrust between policymakers and
educators.50 Crudely characterized, many policymakers believe
schools need external pressure—carrots and sticks—to do better.
School personnel, crudely characterized, believe that policymakers
are mandating performance from schools that includes curing social
ills not within a school’s power to control—like mandating an end to
poverty itself. Further, many school personnel feel that policymakers
are forcing them to eliminate valuable educational materials that are
48. See id.; Monty Neill, A Child Is Not a Test Score: Assessment as a Civil Rights Issue,
ROOT & BRANCH, Fall 2009, at 28, available at http://www.fairtest.org/files/root%20&%
20branch%20fall%20-%20MN%20testing%20only.pdf.
49. Richard F. Elmore, The Problem of Capacity in the (Re)Design of Educational
Accountability Systems, in NCLB AT THE CROSSROADS: REEXAMINING THE FEDERAL EFFORT
TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 230, 230 (Michael A. Rebell & Jessica R. Wolff eds., 2009).
50. See Steven Brill, The Rubber Room, NEW YORKER, Aug. 31, 2009, at 30.
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not on the test.51 Surely many policymakers engaged in education
reform view teachers and administrators as sincere and motivated.
But other policymakers whose theory of motivation is tied to
markets, particularly in the political arena, believe that schools have a
motivation issue because they are not subject to market demands.52
Ideas about motivation are an important part of the reform
movement.
The cultural differences between schools and policy makers are
substantial. The story of motivation told in the market arena may be
confounded in the schools culture. For example, in response to a
survey asking whether they would want merit pay for improved test
scores, fewer than 17.23 percent of teachers somewhat or strongly
favored merit pay, while 60 percent strongly opposed.53 This result
suggests an enormous number of potential ―winners‖ in such a
system (those who would benefit from higher pay) do not want a
valuation system that reflects their achievement on that metric. By
contrast, 72 percent of teachers surveyed favored a pay bonus for
teaching in ―a high-priority situation (e.g., in an inner-city school),‖ a
concept often given the unfortunate name ―combat pay.‖54 If we
decide to tell a simple economic story of motivation about these
numbers (that working conditions are being traded for wages), we
miss a potential insight into the intrinsic motivations of educators and
the alternative (non-market) values in the schools culture.
If politicians and some policymakers like testing because it fits a
market-based story of motivation, parents and some policymakers
may lend their political support to testing for a different reason. The
common metric of testing appears to be designed in part to let noneducators see a ranking or assessment that is otherwise inscrutable to
them because they are not qualified as educators to evaluate school
51. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
52. See Steven Brill, The Teachers‟ Unions‟ Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, § 6
(Magazine), at MM32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/magazine/23Racet.html?pagewanted=Id_rl.
53. Dan Goldhaber, Michael DeArmond & Scott DeBurgomaster, Teacher Attitudes
About Compensation Reform: Implications for Reform Implementation 9–10 (Ctr. on
Reinventing Pub. Educ., Working Paper No. 20, 2007), available at http://www.crpe.org/cs/
crpe/download/csr_files/wp_sfrp20_goldhaber_aug07.pdf.
54. Id.
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quality. It is a translation device between school and non-school
cultures. Just as an economist might admit that rational
acquisitiveness does not represent the truth of social life55 but rather
is a theoretical system that by simplification allows prediction,56
standards proponents know that education is not summed up by test
results but that the simplification of education through test results
permits important prediction and discussion by non-educators.
Commensurability—the possibility of comparison—is the virtue
sought by those without enough expertise to make qualitative
judgments along non-standard metrics. So policymakers are seeking
simplicity to bridge the gap between themselves and educators. If
they seek transformation, it is transformation up the scale of the
metric. The insights from the commodification and behavioral
economics literatures might suggest that a metric of measurement and
monitoring will have unintended transformative effects other than
movement up that scale.
Some policymakers see the problem in schools as one of
compliance with expectations and are strategic in pressuring schools
with the threat of sanctions.57 School personalities tend to be less
strategic and approach mandates sincerely so long as there is the
capacity to achieve them.58 But when there is not capacity, either
because the institution and its personnel lack necessary skills and
information or because the goal is impossible, the response of schools
can be counter-productive.59 Critics of NCLB in particular and the
standards movement more generally point to these negative
influences that standards have within schools.60
The part of the reform movement that is our concern is in part a
battle over the theory of motivation in schools. This is particularly
visible in the political arena where schools are debated through the
lens of attitudes toward government services and toward unions. But
55. See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008).
56. See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 53–55 (1990).
57. Elmore, supra note 49, at 230–31.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/15

2011]

Testing as Commodification

323

the second strand in the testing movement, the one that translates
something about educational quality to non-education experts such as
parents, provides political support for the education reform
movement and may explain its success. It is understandable that a
single metric of comparison is attractive to people like parents, with
great reason to care about educational quality but without the
expertise to know what high quality means. The two reasons for a
common metric—translation and motivation—converge in the testing
regime.
IV. HOW TESTS CHANGE SCHOOLS:
WHAT IS ―TEACHING TO THE TEST‖?
The range of criticisms about school responses to the standards
movement may be summed up in the frequent complaint that schools
are now ―teaching to the test.‖61 This is an interesting complaint,
because the creation of standards and assessments (tests) to check
achievement of those standards is in a sense a direct call to teach to
the test. Schools are expected to focus their efforts on teaching
students the content and skills mandated by the standards movement,
with the knowledge that success in teaching those skills is determined
by test performance. Teaching the materials for the test is the goal.
Therefore, to evaluate this criticism of testing, we need a fuller
picture of its purported harms.
Certainly schools divert some energy to teaching test-taking skills
that may not be content-oriented, such as how to eliminate options
when evaluating a multiple choice question. Almost every public
school now does some of this, and this is relatively easy to label
wasted time.62 But when schools are not teaching test-taking skills,
the accountability strand of the testing movement seeks to have
teachers teach to the test, at least for the substance. In theory, as long
as the test is ―good,‖ meaning an accurate measure of whether
61. See, e.g., How Standardized Testing Damages Education, FAIRTEST (Aug. 20, 2007),
http://www.fairtest.org/facts/howharm.htm; Teaching to the Test, BUS.-MANAGED DEMOCRACY,
http://herinst.org/BusinessManagedDemocracy/education/curricula/teachtest.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2011).
62. Teaching to the Test, supra note 61.
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students learned what we think they needed to learn, testing
advocates can argue that there is little harm in teaching to the test.
A. Narrowing the Curriculum
Yet there is solid evidence that the curriculum in schools across
the country is narrowing to align with whatever content is being
tested and that many schools, children, and parents are unhappy about
this development.63 Reports of schools cutting recess, art, and music
are routine, and even cuts to social studies are too common.64 One
can immediately see the conflict in values between those who sought
a narrowing of focus to the core reading and math skills and those
who see the goals of education more broadly.
Reports of narrowed curricula are widespread. From books with
provocative titles like What Happened to Recess and Why Are Our
Children Struggling in Kindergarten?65 to government statistics
showing an increase in time spent on language arts and math and a
decrease in time spent on science and social studies,66 the consensus
is that schools across the country have adapted their curricula to
focus on subjects that are tested by reducing the time spent on
subjects that are not a part of the testing program, such as social
studies, and ones that are not susceptible to standardized testing at all,
such as music, art, and physical education.67 Newspapers report on
63. See Wayne Au, High-Stakes Testing and Curricular Control: A Qualitative
Metasynthesis, 36 EDUC. RESEARCHER 258, 259 (2007), available at http://www.aera.net/up
loadedFiles/Publications/Journals/Educational_Researcher/3605/07EDR07_258-267.pdf (study
finding curriculum narrowing as a result of high-stakes testing); Brian M. Stecher,
Consequences of Large-Scale, High-Stakes Testing on School and Classroom Practice, in
MAKING SENSE OF TEST-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION 79, 91–94 (Laura S.
Hamilton, Brain M. Stecher & Stephn P. Klein eds., 2002), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monograph_reports/MR1554/MR1554.ch4.pdf (describing phenomenon of ―Negative
Curriculum Reallocation‖).
64. Alfie Kohn, Editorial, Emphasis on Testing Leads to Sacrifices in Other Areas, USA
TODAY (Aug. 21, 2001), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2001-08-22-ncguest1.htm.
65. SUSAN OHANIAN, WHAT HAPPENED TO RECESS AND WHY ARE OUR CHILDREN
STRUGGLING IN KINDERGARTEN? (2002) (an anti-testing manifesto).
66. Beth A. Morton & Ben Dalton, Changes in Instructional Hours in Four Subjects by
Public School Teachers of Grades 1 Through 4, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., 4 (May 2002),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007305.pdf.
67. Claus von Zastrow with Helen Jane, Academic Atrophy: The Condition of the Liberal
Arts in America‟s Public Schools, COUNCIL FOR BASIC EDUC., 7 (Mar. 2004), http://www.menc.
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the trend68 as educators wring their hands over the trade-offs they are
pressed to make.
Here we find an analogy to the commodification literature. One
set of values are measurable, are measured, and can be made
commensurable, and another set of values are not or cannot be placed
on a metric. Rather than simply describing the world, this
phenomenon places pressure to re-design the world so that we place
our energies behind only what is measured. Here the need to make
items commensurable leads to a worse result than a simple failure to
describe the character of the good in question (education) by placing
that good on a common metric. It actually transforms the character of
the item. The description is self-fulfilling: education becomes the
thing we have tools to measure about education.
In the context of education, it is difficult to argue that this
commensurability has not corrupted the character of the item,
because what schools do has changed since we began forcing schools
to measure and compare along a common metric. We have
diminished social skills development, character and self-discovery,
research skills, physical education, creative endeavors from art and
music to theater and even creative writing, science instruction, and
the understanding of diverse social organizations conveyed in social
studies.
Is this a loss? Good test performance does not appear to generalize
outside of the tests themselves to these areas69—teaching good test
org/documents/legislative/AcademicAtrophy.pdf (finding increased instruction in reading,
math, and science and decreased instruction in the arts, especially in high minority districts);
Jennifer McMurrer, Choices, Changes, and Challenges: Curriculum and Instruction in the
NCLB Era, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, 1 (Dec. 2007), http://www.cep-dc.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=document.showDocumentByID&nodeID=1&DocumentID=212 (reporting an increase in
reading and math instruction and a decrease in other areas). While physical fitness is
periodically subject to assessment under national or statewide programs, these are in the nature
of health screenings, because fitness itself is not the direct learning objective of physical
education but rather the acquisition of skills and knowledge toward the development of active
and healthy lifestyles. See, e.g., CAL. ST. BD. OF EDUC., Physical Education Model Content
Standards for California Public Schools: Kindergarten through Grade Twelve, at vi (2006),
available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/pestandards.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Schools Cut Back Subjects to Push Reading and Math, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 1, at 21.
69. Daniel M. Koretz et al., The Effects of High-Stakes Testing on Achievement:
Preliminary Findings About Generalization Across Tests, EDUC. RESOURCES INFO. CTR., 20–21
(Apr. 5, 1991), http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/
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performance does not lead to the successful teaching of many valued
and useful subjects and skills. The character of education has been
transformed by the common metric. The goals of education are now
contained by the limits of our ability to measure, rank, and compare,
not by the limits of our values for education.70
B. “Testing Gains, Not Learning Gains”71
A different harm from teaching to the test arises because the tests,
to be administrable across a large population, must be simplified for
the sake of uniformity. Any good educator needs to assess regularly
what her students are learning. Those who object to the education
reform movement still acknowledge the importance of some
assessment to understand what gains students are making. But the
current assessments are a tail that wags the dog of educational
decision making, because the consequences of disappointing
outcomes are so severe and because the metric is universal regardless
of school structure, goals, philosophy, resources, and population. The
accountability provisions are having their intended effect: they are
getting schools to drop everything and focus on a few uniform
measures. The tests are not helpful servants of a school curriculum
designed to accomplish many goals. Instead, they become the goal.
This places greater confidence in the test validity of any one
instrument than even test-makers and proponents would claim.
If instead schools were using multiple sources of evidence of
learning, each appropriate to one hoped for gain, they might produce
a more sophisticated sense of whether they are making gains along all
the measures that are hoped for. Prior to the standards movement,
schools traditionally used many forms of assessment in that way, by
looking at portfolio work, verbal assessment, or instruments intended
0000019b/80/23/82/30.pdf (concluding that performance on tests does not generalize more
broadly and that teachers focus on content specific to test).
70. See David L. Berliner, MCLB (Much Curriculum Left Behind): A U.S. Calamity in the
Making, 73 EDUC. F. 284, 294–95 (2009); Charles Rooney with Bob Schaeffer, Test Scores Do
Not Equal Merit: Enhancing Equity & Excellence in College Admissions by Deemphasizing
SAT and ACT Results, FAIRTEST (Sept. 1998), http://www.fairtest.org/files/optrept.pdf.
71. JONATHAN KOZOL, LETTERS TO A YOUNG TEACHER 120 (2007); see also Koretz et al.,
supra note 69, at 1.
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to measure very specific and localized learning gains such as content
knowledge associated with a science project. By combining a range
of assessments, schools could evaluate whether they were achieving
gains in student learning defined a number of different ways and tied
directly to curriculum units.72 But in today’s high stakes testing
world, success has one measure: the statewide annual uniform test.
Like an economic market that allows us to compare numbered prices
as full representatives of value, numbered test scores are on a path to
becoming the full representatives of value in education.
C. Corrupted Schools
In the commodification literature, markets corrupt values by
changing the character of goods and extinguishing non-market
valuations.73 In the behavioral economics literature, external rewards
and metrics change human motivation by diminishing intrinsic
motivation. But in education, a most old-fashioned variety of
corruption has shown up with disturbing regularity as individual
teachers, and sometimes entire schools, cheat or assist their students
in cheating on standardized tests.74 This gives a different and more
literal spin to the idea of corruption in the commodification and
behavioral economic literatures. Teacher cheating reflects the
intensity of the disconnection between school personnel and the
standards advocates.
An increasing number of schools have been judged ―failing‖
under the new standards regime, and climbing up the metric of test
scores by any means attracts some school personnel to a deep
betrayal of educational values. Imagine the cynicism toward
education experienced by a student whose teacher assists her in
cheating on a test, and you can see the three versions of corruption
converge.
72. Surely with multiple assessments of different varieties it is more difficult to hold
schools accountable for uniform standards. A trade-off has occurred among goods and values
rather than a climb up a common vision of quality.
73. See generally RADIN, supra note 7; RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 7.
74. Kris Axtman, When Tests‟ Cheaters Are the Teachers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan.
11, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0111/p01s03-ussc.html; Shaila Dewan, Georgia
Schools Inquiry Finds Signs of Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at A14.
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But corruption takes a less literal form in schools as well, one
closer to the description Michael Sandel elaborates—degradation of
goods by diminishment of non-market modes of valuation.75 We have
seen the way curriculum content is narrowed to meet the uniform
metrics, such that science and social studies take a back seat to math
and language arts.76 But the skills portion of education is similarly
narrowed to that which can be assessed on a statewide test. Many
tests have an open response component, but because every student in
every state must take the test, a large portion is multiple choice. This
makes it difficult to demonstrate thinking skills, much less creativity.
Testing proponents may view this as just a difficulty of instrument
design. But in the case of thinking and creativity skills, testing might
look for what’s inherently uniform in attributes valued in part
because they are individual and incomparable in some ways. How
can educators genuinely value what’s incommensurable in these
skills in a regime that defines value in ranked comparison to others?
Consider the value students derive from the experience of
performing in a play, and then ask what of that value we can measure
in a way that allows us to conclude that one set of students attained
more of ―it‖ than another. Public speaking confidence? Appreciation
of others by embodying a role? Teamwork? Tackling uncomfortable
tasks? Most educators, and probably many non-educators, believe
that these skills and experiences have educational value, but that
belief itself is threatened by the inability to make uniform
assessments in our current standardizing system. It is not simply that
the values at stake are not susceptible to measurement, though that
may be true. It is that uniformity is not exactly a desired outcome—if
the skills at stake could be measured and compared, we would be
assuming more is better along a single line. That is how the argument
from incommensurability meets the argument from corruption:
incommensurability of value should not mean there is no value, but
the practice of commensurability/comparison corrupts education such
that we no longer value what we cannot measure and also what we
cannot compare. This is what Kozol calls the ―demeaning anti-human
75. Sandel, supra note 16, at 94.
76. See supra Part IV.A.
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view of childhood‖77 that utilitarianism in education implies: it’s an
anti-human system if it fails to give meaningful energy to the
development of attributes whose value is wrapped up in their
incomparability.
Student discovery of content instead of being handed content
similarly develops important life skills. Discovery is what happens
when the learning process includes time for children and adults alike
to experiment and find information. A rushed curriculum, on the
other hand, asks us to more efficiently deliver information—to spoon
feed what ought to be discovered. This may improve test scores
without improving retention. More importantly, children fail to learn
the skill of discovery. Many educators have pointed out that
attainment of the knowledge to achieve on standardized tests in
public K-12 schooling today has not been validated to attainment of
anything in particular that a young adult might need.78 The ability to
find or discover information seems more adapted to a changing and
unpredictable future than the information itself. This is why anti-test
leader Alfie Kohn argues that improved test scores are ruining
schools.79
Examples of educational values that are in a similar, untestable
zone are easy to find. Schools cannot test team-building behavior,
problem-solving, attitude, adaptability, motivation, curiosity,
situation sense, flexibility, leadership, ethics, open-mindedness,
patience, compromise, conflict-resolution, or self-expression. But
many agree that children need to develop these capacities to be
happy, good, and successful individuals, citizens, and workers in
their adult lives.80 That we cannot place those values onto the central
metric for measurement diminishes their importance to educational
culture today, and the ―market‖ becomes flat, the character of the
item corrupted, and genuine value is lost. If the question, ―What does
77. Kozol, supra note 1, at 22.
78. Larry Cuban, Why Bad Reforms Won‟t Give Us Good Schools, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 1,
2001),
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=why_bad_reforms_wont_give_us_good_
schools; Koretz et al., supra note 69, at 1 (concluding that performance on tests does not
generalize more broadly and that teachers focus on content specific to test).
79. Kohn, supra note 27.
80. Jonathan Kozol, The Details of Life, THE NATION, May 22, 2000, at 15, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/details-life; Berliner, supra note 70, at 290–91.
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a child need to become a fulfilled adult?‖ were the same as the
question, ―What makes a good education?,‖ education would look
different from today’s standards and benchmarks-based institution.
This might explain in part the suddenly common newspaper or
magazine article that asks whether education is still relevant to
success in life.81
These observations beg a number of questions. What are the
proper goals for public education, which values among those goals
are being compromised, and why? Additionally, what do markets and
testing have in common that make them such powerful modes of
valuation such that they seem to threaten other modes of valuation so
easily? The next two sections take up these concerns in turn.
V. THE HISTORY OF PLURALISM IN EDUCATION: DOES QUALITY
EDUCATION MEAN UNIFORM EDUCATION?
Throughout the history of public education in the United States,
there has not been consensus around a single goal for the institution.
Rather, a variety of goals and purposes have been held out as
justifications for public education. It was Jefferson’s ideal that public
schools were necessary to prepare citizens to effectively participate in
the new democratic form of government by creating literacy,
deliberation, and reasoning skills that would inform voting and
prepare some in the newly classless society to run for office.82
Other justifications that have fueled the institutionalization of
state-funded education in the United States have included resolving
cultural conflict that arises in a diverse society of immigrants through
shared experience across family and ethnic backgrounds. Education
was promoted by earlier arrivals as a way to create a common
American identity with later arrivals. Public education is also
supposed to prepare workers to serve the economy and prepare
workers to improve their own standing in the idealized classless
81. See, e.g., Rebecca Mead, Learning by Degrees, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 21.
82. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 6 (1983).
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society. It has been charged with promoting social order, industrious
habits, and intelligent citizenship.83
At many points in American history, education has been offered
as the basis for a theoretically classless society where individuals can
compete for wealth based on skills and abilities cultivated on an
equal playing field, and the equality ideals embedded in the
American form of government have been thought to depend on the
availability of free, adequate public education for all children.84
Important to this Essay, no one single justification and purpose for
public education has triumphed in either the education or the political
discourse. Rather, multiple purposes have co-existed as schools grew
out of local communities with only loose oversight at the state level
and almost no guidance at the federal level. Pluralism and community
have been at the heart of public education, and localism managed
particularized community values and goals, preventing the
dominance of a singular vision for education.85
This is not a claim that any ideal has been achieved in the public
education system now or in the past. Indeed, the education system
has notoriously failed low-income rural and urban children,
immigrants, and children of color in particular.86 But requiring
identical output from schools with vastly different resources,
challenges, and cultures does not improve on that problem. Rather,
the problems of inequality in school resources and challenges are
minimized by an expectation of equal output on a testing metric.
Some critics of testing focus on unintended consequences such as
cheating and compromised curricula.87 But other critiques of
standardized testing reject the concept of measurement more
thoroughly.88 For example, a recent article criticizing the standards
83. Id. at 7–8, 75–83.
84. Of course this is not a claim that public education has produced a classless society and
social mobility. My commentator Kieran Healy focuses in part on the role that education plays
in the social justification for unequal opportunities and on education as an authoritative system
and relates testing to that function. I have no particular objection to his comments in this regard.
85. KAESTLE, supra note 82, passim.
86. Sarah Deschenes, Larry Cuban & David Tyack, Mismatch: Historical Perspectives on
Schools and Students Who Don‟t Fit Them, 103 TCHRS. L. REC. 525, 530–31 (2001).
87. See Axtman, supra note 74; Berliner, supra note 70, at 294–95.
88. See Kohn, supra note 27.
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movement is poignantly titled A Child Is Not a Test Score,89 using the
kind of language that has so concerned market commodification
critics like Elizabeth Anderson in other contexts when price is
substituted for test score.
These perspectives speak to the lack of consensus on the purposes
of public education. The genius, though, of American public
education has been its ability to withstand this lack of consensus and
to thrive in the notion of pluralism. The uniformity of the
standardized test movement threatens this pluralism of purpose with a
top-down set of purposes selected from among the many. Public
education has always failed its ideals in many respects. But at
different times and in different places the multiplicity of ideals has
shaped pluralistic educational agendas, failure to achieve success
with many of those agendas notwithstanding. The testing trend takes
multiple values that have co-existed and reduces them to the one
value, which even in its best light can only be expressed as
competence in math, reading, and writing, without reference to other
necessary skills for a fulfilling life or citizenship. Not only is this a
flat choice among the numerous values public education serves, it
fails to reach the citizenship values that have long helped to justify
the public investment in free education.
VI. COMMON POWER IN THE TWO METRICS:
MONEY AND TEST SCORES
Testing does not map perfectly onto literal markets, and we could
surely spend time drawing out differences. But the similarities can be
uncanny. My question is what the lessons of the comparison might
be. Several occur as possibilities. If alternative values are just that—
values—why can’t they stand up to market norms or testing norms?
Why do markets (tests) extinguish plural conceptions of personhood
(education)? I offer two possible answers. The first asks whether the
power lies in numerosity itself: rank orderings cascade inevitably
toward flattening values. The second asks whether the standards
movement in schools is linked more literally to economic markets.
89. Neill, supra note 48, at 28.
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A. Numerosity
Does the power to deflate and flatten plural values stem from the
ability to compare along a single metric? We might call a person
adventurous and another loyal, recognize that these are different
values, struggle to compare them, but in the end recognize that they
will not be pressed into an agreeable ordering. But when numeric
values are at play, the ordering comes naturally. Perhaps the
overpowering ethics of markets and testing arise from numerosity.
This point is reflected somewhat in the opening quotation by
Jonathan Kozol pointing to the de-humanizing utilitarianism reflected
in tests. Uniformity for comparison purposes binds together
money/markets and scores/schools.90 Incommensurability relies on
metrics that cannot standardize, and if incommensurability is
necessary to the maintenance of plural values, then testing and
markets cannot maintain plural values.
The literature on crowding-out intrinsic motivations with extrinsic
ones suggests that context matters. Sometimes extrinsic pay is highly
effective. Perhaps there are not robust intrinsic motivations to be
displaced, for example, when pay is used to motivate behavior in
certain contexts. Sometimes one metric of value is enough. In other
contexts, it matters greatly. Although there does not yet seem to be
extensive work in the behavioral economics literature on the impact
of standardized testing on intrinsic motivations, related and relevant
study is sobering. There have been several experiments with paying
students for higher test scores. The findings vary somewhat but
generally point to either no or small increases in test scores, followed
by decline to levels worse than before the incentives were introduced
when the extrinsic pay is removed.91 These studies do not
demonstrate that testing without pay leads to crowding-out, but they
do suggest that there are intrinsic motivations in place in the
educational setting capable of being crowded-out such that the theory
of crowding out of motivations disrupts a standard carrot-and-stick
90. See generally Michael Winerip, Our Towns; Never Mind the Inventive Curriculum.
One Test Fits All, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 18, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/nyregion/
our-towns-never-mind-the-inventive-curriculum-one-test-fits-all.html?n=Top/Reference/Times
%20Topics/Organizations/B/Board%20of%20Regents&pagewanted=print.
91. See generally Bettinger, supra note 15; Garbarino & Slonim, supra note 15.
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model of motivation in schools. More than one set of values drive
schools.
If the schools context is full of incommensurable motivating
values, if education has robust ―plural meanings‖ in Radin’s
terminology, the rankings associated with a single metric may do
more damage to education than they do to typical market
commodities. Numerosity may flatten out more incommensurable
values when there are more to flatten. If education is such a good,
than the single numeric scores from tests can behave like prices in the
area of other goods with robust plural meanings, such as reproductive
labor, friendship, housing, or sex.92 These goods with plural
meanings suffer when prices purport to exhaust their value.93 If the
harm of pricing derives in large part from the numeric ranking itself,
testing should do the same to education.
B. Creation of Workers
A different possibility is that markets as we understand them
conventionally are embedded in the standards movement. That is, the
uniformity of purpose occurs because it relates to a particular marketbased idea about the purpose of public education, which is workforce
readiness.94 In a non-uniform system of schooling, multiple
conceptions of the purposes of public education have co-existed,
sometimes within one school, and sometimes across different schools
and school systems. That is, the original explanation for U.S. public
schooling, the Jeffersonian conception that self-government
depended on an educated electorate, is a citizenship-based rationale
for public schools. Many schools in the United States have embraced
that purpose, with preparation for citizenship an explicit goal that
also pervades the curriculum. But schools are also, and have long
been, purposed with improving the economic prospects of
individuals, thus, in theory, de-classing the society. This posits a
market-based reason for public education that serves the students;
92. RADIN, supra note 7, at 105–07.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Evan Osborne, Education Reform as Economic Reform, 25 CATO J. 297, 297
(2005). The same emphasis can be found in the 1983 A Nation at Risk report. See A NATION AT
RISK, supra note 32.
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education gives individuals the opportunity to achieve upward class
mobility in the economy. But the nebulous concept of ―the economy‖
itself is also served by a prepared workforce, and fears of
international competition for the best-educated workforce, while long
present, seem to have increased in pitch. Perhaps the similarity
between the commodification literature and the standards movement
in public education exposes the increasingly tight nexus between
markets and public education.
Consider the school choice movement, which is tightly linked to
the broader standards movement. The school choice movement seeks
to harness explicitly market-based mechanisms of comparison
shopping by parents in an effort to improve the quality of schools by
making them work to retain their students.95 Parents are expected to
vote with their feet by comparing test scores among schools. That
school choice has not worked particularly well—parents want to
preserve their school communities rather than shop among them—
suggests that parents themselves want schools to serve a broader
purpose for their child than the production of improved test scores.96
But the choice movement suggests a link in the minds of education
reformers between uniform tests and markets.
In response to this explanation—that markets and standardized
testing may have a closer link than numerosity alone—we might ask
how the elimination of critical thinking, team-building, or selfawareness, for example, could possibly serve the economy. I have no
ready answer to this question, and would note that the paradox may
explain some of the recent hand-wringing over whether education
still has value.97 But perhaps the short-hand of comparing workers
that only homogeneity of metrics can deliver may explain why some
skills are worth giving up in exchange for the ability to order
potential workers.
95. Lynn Bosetti, Determinants of School Choice: Understanding How Parents Choose
Elementary Schools in Alberta, 19 J. EDUC. POL’Y 387, 388 (2004).
96. Id.; John Coldron & Pam Boulton, „Happiness‟ as a Criterion of Parents‟ Choice of
School, 6 J. EDUC. POL’Y, 169, 169 (1991); PAUL TESKE, JODY FITZPATRICK & GABRIEL
KAPLAN, OPENING DOORS: HOW LOW-INCOME PARENTS SEARCH FOR THE RIGHT SCHOOL 4
(2007), available at http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_crpe_open_jan07.pdf.
97. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 81.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The comparison between the testing movement and the
commodification literature is not perfect, because commodification is
used to describe a process of putting something into the market for
exchange at a price. But they have in common being counted,
measured, and compared along a single metric and being subject to
the related process of flattening or thinning out whatever values
cannot be reconciled with the numbered and ranked system. From the
comparison we draw cautionary notes for the testing movement, areas
for further research about motivation in behavioral science, and
translation of a philosophical debate into practical policy.
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